rights and hence and persons themselves, seriously.

 The question of the scope and limits of retrospective moral

judgment is not a mere theoretical puzzle for moral philosophers. It is an eminently practical question, since how we answer it has direct and profound implications for what we ought to do now. Most obviously, the position on the scope and limits of retrospective moral judgment we adopt will determine whether we should honor claims which persons now make for compensation for historical injustices allegedly perpetrated against themselves or their ancestors. Similarly, whether we should punish or penalize agents for actions they performed long ago will depend upon how we understand the proper scope and limits of retrospective moral judgment. More specifically, we must know whether there is any special circumstance due to the historical context in which they acted which should mitigate whatever punishment or penalty would be appropriate, given their culpability. In a sense, however, something even larger is at stake in the debate over retrospective moral judgment: the possibility of moral progress. The idea of moral progress only makes sense if it is possible, not only to make moral judgments about the past, but to make them by appealing to some of the same moral standards that we apply to the present. Unless we can in some sense apply the same moral yardstick to the past and the present, we cannot meaningfully say either that there 2

has been moral progress or that there has not. For example, unless some retrospective moral judgments are valid, we cannot say that the abolition of slavery is a case of moral progress. For unless we can say that slavery in the antebellum South was wrong, we cannot say that the abolition of slavery was a moral improvement. And unless we can say that the practice of slavery violated human rights we cannot say that its abolition was a victory for the cause of human rights.

 Recent revelations of the extent and character of radiation

experiments on human beings conducted by agencies of the U.S. Government in the 1940s, 1950s, 1960, and 1970s provide a concrete focus for the problem of retrospective moral judgment. On the one hand, these revelations have evoked moral condemnations of some of the actions involved, and may eventually lead to the conclusion that the rights of some experimental subjects were violated. On the other hand, in some quarters there has been a reluctance to make some or any moral assessments of these past events. For example, an article in Science Trends describing the injection of plutonium into 18 nonconsenting men, women, and children during the Manhattan Project conclusion that “Whether [this action]…can be equated with Nazi Wartime experiments is today considered moot."[cite]

 This last sentence expresses a marked, but not uncommon

ambivalence about retrospective moral judgments. The statement implies we all know that the Nazi experiments were wrong, but at the same time suggests that it is inappropriate or pointless today to apply to the radiation experiments of a few decades ago the same 3

standards by which we judge the Nazi experiments to be wrong. Yet, as we have already seen, a great deal depends upon whether we can make moral judgements about the radiation experiments and what sort of judgements we can make. In particular, if the radiation experiments were in some respects the Nazi experiments- -in particular if they involved violations of individuals' rights–then compensation may be owed to those whose rights were violated. And if, in the case of the radiation experiments, as in the case of the Nazi experiments (at least until quite recently), there are identifiable and still living individuals who are culpable for those rights-violations, then it is appropriate to consider whether they ought to be held accountable and if so, in what way.