Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical and biological weapons) and their technology is today one of the most pressing issues and threats to the international peace and security. The use of such weapons goes against everything that international law and, more particularly, humanitarian law stands for. The proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons, commonly grouped as weapons of mass destruction (WMD), as well as their delivery systems (missiles), have the potential to undermine international peace and security. Canada is a potential source of expertise, materials, and technology for countries pursuing WMD or ballistic missile programs, and is a potential target for clandestine and illicit procurement activities. Many countries already possess WMD, or have the capacity to produce them, and an increasing number are in the process of acquiring and developing capabilities to inflict mass casualties and destruction through WMD. While many terrorist groups lack the resources or expertise to employ WMD, there has been a growing interest among certain terrorist groups in acquiring such weapons. The serious issue of proliferation of these weapons has become an urgent matter that many governments are attempting to address. Chemical and Biological Weapons Because chemical and biological weapons are easier and less expensive to produce than nuclear ones, and the technology and know-how are widely available, many more states are actively engaged in chemical and biological weapons programs than in nuclear weapons programs. Chemical agents include blood agents, choking agents, blistering agents and nerve agents. Biological agents include bacterial, viral and rickettsial agents (bacteria causing typhus or other fever-related diseases). An individual with some technical training could apply the necessary expertise given supplies and a basic laboratory to make a crude biological weapon. Certainly, any state with a modestly sophisticated pharmaceutical industry is capable of producing biological agents. Fortunately, the frightening potential of biological and chemical weapons is mitigated by several factors, the most important being that it is very difficult to build effective, reliable delivery means for large-scale lethal doses of such agents. Radiological and Nuclear Weapons Most analysts believe that the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities, particularly to less stable or conflict-ridden regions of the world, presents a serious danger to international security. Technical complexities and expense reduce the likelihood that most terrorist groups could construct a nuclear explosive device. A more likely threat from a terrorist organization would be a radiological one involving the dispersal of radioactive substances to contaminate the air or water, or to render a particular area or facility unusable. Delivery Systems Three types of delivery systems are usually considered for WMD-ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and combat aircraft. Among these, the ballistic missile is the greatest proliferation concern because it is extremely difficult to defend against and the time between detection and impact is very limited. Thus, it is no coincidence that virtually all states known to possess or suspected of developing WMD also maintain ballistic missile programs. Despite limited success in some instances, the Missile Technology Control Regime, has proven unable to completely stem the proliferation of ballistic missiles, and the number of states acquiring such missiles and their production capability is likely to continue to grow. This organization was established in 1987 by the governments of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States to prevent the proliferation of unmanned delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction, and to coordinate national export licensing efforts.

History of the term weapon of mass destruction The first use of the term “weapon of mass destruction” on record is by Cosmo Gordon Lang, Archbishop of Canterbury, in 1937 in reference to the aerial bombardment of Guernica, Spain: Who can think at this present time without a sickening of the heart of the appalling slaughter, the suffering, the manifold misery brought by war to Spain and to China? Who can think without horror of what another widespread war would mean, waged as it would be with all the new weapons of mass destruction? At the time, the United States (with help from Western Allies) had yet to develop and use nuclear weapons. Japan conducted research on biological weapons (see Unit 731), and chemical weapons had seen wide use, most notably in World War I. Following the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and progressing through the Cold War, the term came to refer more to non-conventional weapons. The application of the term to specifically nuclear and radiological weapons is traced by William Safire to the Russian phrase “Оружие массового поражения” – oruzhiye massovovo porazheniya (weapons of mass destruction). He credits James Goodby (of the Brookings Institution) with tracing what he considers the earliest known English-language use soon after the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (although it is not quite verbatim): a communique from a 15 November 1945, meeting of Harry Truman, Clement Attlee and Mackenzie King (probably drafted by Vannevar Bush– or so Bush claimed in 1970) referred to “weapons adaptable to mass destruction”. That exact phrase, says Safire, was also used by Bernard Baruch in 1946 (in a speech at the United Nations probably written by Herbert Bayard Swope). The same phrase found its way into the very first resolution adopted by the United Nations General assembly in January 1946 in London, which used the wording “…the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other weapons adaptable to mass destruction.” This resolution also created the Atomic Energy Commission (predecessor of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)). An exact use of this term was given in a lecture “Atomic Energy as an Atomic Problem” by J. Robert Oppenheimer. The lecture was delivered to the Foreign Service and the State Department, on 17 September 1947. The lecture is reprinted in The Open Mind (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1955). “It is a very far reaching control which would eliminate the rivalry between nations in this field, which would prevent the surreptitious arming of one nation against another, which would provide some cushion of time before atomic attack, and presumably therefore before any attack with weapons of mass destruction, and which would go a long way toward removing atomic energy at least as a source of conflict between the powers”. The term was also used in the introduction to the hugely influential US Government Document known as NSC-68 written in April 1950. During a televised presentation about the Cuban Missile Crisis on 22 October 1962, John F. Kennedy made reference to “offensive weapons of sudden mass destruction.” An early use of the exact phrase in an international treaty was in the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, however no definition was provided. Evolution of its use During the Cold War, the term “weapons of mass destruction” was primarily a reference to nuclear weapons. At the time, in the West the euphemism “strategic weapons” was used to refer to the American nuclear arsenal, which was presented as a necessary deterrent against nuclear or conventional attack from the Soviet Union (see Mutual Assured Destruction). The term “weapons of mass destruction” continued to see periodic use throughout this time, usually in the context of nuclear arms control; Ronald Reagan used it during the 1986 Reykjavík Summit, when referring to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. Reagan’s successor, George H.W. Bush, used the term in an 1989 speech to the United Nations, using it primarily in reference to chemical arms. The end of the Cold War reduced U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons as a deterrent, causing it to shift its focus to disarmament. This period coincided with an increasing threat to U.S. interests from Islamic nations and independent Islamic groups. With the 1990 invasion of Kuwait and 1991 Gulf War, Iraq’s nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs became a particular concern of the first Bush Administration. Following the war, Bill Clinton and other western politicians and media continued to use the term, usually in reference to ongoing attempts to dismantle Iraq’s weapons programs. After the 11 September 2001 attacks and the 2001 anthrax attacks, an increased fear of non-conventional weapons and asymmetrical warfare took hold of the United States and other Western powers. This fear reached a crescendo with the 2002 Iraq disarmament crisis and the alleged existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq that became the primary justification for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. However, no WMD were found in Iraq. Because of its prolific use during this period, the American Dialect Society voted “weapons of mass destruction” (and its abbreviation, “WMD”) the word of the year in 2002,[10] and in 2003 Lake Superior State University added WMD to its list of terms banished for “Mis-use, Over-use and General Uselessness”. In its Criminal Complaint against the main suspect of the Boston Marathon bombing of 15 April 2013, the FBI refers to a pressure-cooker improvised bomb as a “weapon of mass destruction”. Public perceptions of WMD Awareness and opinions of WMD have varied during the course of their history. Their threat is a source of unease, security, and pride to different people. The anti-WMD movement is embodied most in nuclear disarmament, and led to the formation of the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in 1957. In order to increase awareness of all kinds of WMD, in 2004 the nuclear physicist and Nobel Peace Prize winner Joseph Rotblat inspired the creation of The WMD Awareness Programme to provide trustworthy and up to date information on WMD world wide. In 1998 University of New Mexico’s Institute for Public Policy released their third report on US perceptions – including the general public, politicians and scientists – of nuclear weapons since the breakup of the Soviet Union. Risks of nuclear conflict, proliferation, and terrorism were seen as substantial. While maintenance of a nuclear US arsenal was considered above average in importance, there was widespread support for a reduction in the stockpile, and very little support for developing and testing new nuclear weapons. Also in 1998, but after the UNM survey was conducted, nuclear weapons became an issue in India’s election of March, in relation to political tensions with neighboring Pakistan. Prior to the election the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) announced it would “declare India a nuclear weapon state” after coming to power. BJP won the elections, and on 14 May, three days after India tested nuclear weapons for the second time, a public opinion poll reported that a majority of Indians favored the country’s nuclear build-up. On 15 April 2004, the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) reported that US citizens showed high levels of concern regarding WMD, and that preventing the spread of nuclear weapons should be “a very important US foreign policy goal”, accomplished through multilateral arms control rather than the use of military threats. A majority also believed the US should be more forthcoming with its biological research and its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty commitment of nuclear arms reduction, and incorrectly thought the US was a party to various non-proliferation treaties. A Russian opinion poll conducted on 5 August 2005 indicated half the population believes new nuclear powers have the right to possess nuclear weapons. 39% believes the Russian stockpile should be reduced, though not fully eliminated.

World map with nuclear weapons development status represented by color. • Five “nuclear weapons states” from the NPT • Other states known to possess nuclear weapons • States formerly possessing nuclear weapons • States suspected of being in the process of developing nuclear weapons and/or nuclear programs • States which at one point had nuclear weapons and/or nuclear weapons research programs • States that possess nuclear weapons, but have not widely adopted them

EU Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction The European Union must act with resolve, using all instruments and policies at its disposal, to prevent, deter, halt and, where possible, eliminate programmes for the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles.

A growing threat to peace and security The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and especially nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and their means of delivery (medium- and long-range missiles, cruise missiles and UAV) are a growing cause for concern. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, in conjunction with the dissemination of dual-use technology and knowledge, increases the risk of such weapons being used by States or falling into the hands of terrorist groups which could threaten the EU, directly or indirectly, including its broader interests (expatriate communities and economic interests). For an effective multilateralist response In the context of effectively combating proliferation, the EU should adopt a forceful, multilateral approach, in cooperation with the United States and its other partners. Export controls and the support of multilateral institutions charged with verification and upholding of compliance with the treaties are considered fundamental. In addition to preventive measures (multilateral treaties and export control regimes), there are, where appropriate, coercive measures under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter and international law (sanctions, selective or global, interceptions of shipments and the use of force, etc.). Three factors are to be taken into consideration to face up to the threat of WMD:  the importance of multilateralism: the multilateral treaty system provides the legal basis for all the EU’s non-proliferation efforts. The universalisation of the norms laid down in the international treaties and their protocols - the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, NPT (FR), the International Atomic Energy Authority IAEA agreements, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention TWC, the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation and the Commission nuclear Test Ban Treaty organisation CTBT (FR) is considered as an EU political objective, as is improving verification of the violations of these norms;  the need to promote a stable regional and international environment: the EU will ensure that regional security arrangements, by attacking the underlying causes for proliferation, and regional arms control and disarmament processes are put in place. It will pay particular attention to the issue of proliferation in the Mediterranean area;  close cooperation with key partners: a common approach and cooperation with key partners (United States, Russian Federation, Japan and Canada), the United Nations and other international organisations are essential in order to effectively implement the WMD non-proliferation regime. Prevent, halt and, if possible, eliminate proliferation programms

The EU must integrate across the board, in order to maximize their effectiveness, the wide range of instruments it has available to combat WMD proliferation:

 multilateral treaties and their verification mechanisms;  national and internationally coordinated export controls;  cooperative threat-reduction programms;  political and economic levers;  prohibition of illegal procurement activities;  coercive measures in accordance with the UN Charter.  The EU’s strategy implementation plan is based on an action plan which will be subject to regular revision. It is based on four priorities:

First priority: resolute action against proliferators:

 universalisation and, when necessary, strengthening of the main treaties, agreements and verification arrangements;  fostering the role of the UN Security Council;  enhancing political, financial and technical support to verification regimes;  strengthening export control policies and practices;  enhancing the security of proliferation-sensitive materials, equipment and expertise in the European Union against unauthorised access;  strengthening identification, control and interception of illegal trafficking.

Second priority: a stable international and regional environment:

 reinforcing EU cooperative programmes with other countries, targeted at support for disarmament, control and security of sensitive materials, facilities and expertise;  integrating the WMD non-proliferation concerns into the EU’s other activities and policies to increase their effectiveness.  Third priority: cooperating closely with the United States and other key partners.

Fourth priority: developing the necessary structures within the Union:

 setting up a monitoring centre at the Council Secretariat entrusted with the monitoring of the consistent implementation of the EU strategy. Since 2004 a six-monthly progress report has been presented to the Council of the EU for approval.

Bibliography: “Weapons of mass deception – SourceWatch”. Sourcewatch.org. Retrieved 5 August 2010. http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/foreign_and_security_policy/cfsp_and_esdp_implementation/l33234_en.htm http://www.globalissues.org/issue Russian public opinion on nuclear weapons (5 August 2005). “Russian public opinion on nuclear weapons – Blog – Russian strategic nuclear forces” Text Sources: New York Times, Los Angeles Times, The New Yorker, Time, Newsweek.