
Should the present government continue its search for those who collaborated with the previous communist authorities (or let things rest as they are?)
“Fortis est veritas et praevalebit” says the Latin proverb. Indeed, in the case of the Polish public service the strong truth seems to have prevailed. Since 2007, when the new law prosecuting secret agents under the communist regime, many a public figure turned out to have been working for the Soviet-backed secret service. Although some journalists suggest that this “which-hunt” for past operatives be stopped (Day, 2007), others state that there is never too late to uncover the truth (Ash, 2007).
“Fortis est veritas et praevalebit” says the Latin proverb. Indeed, in the case of the Polish public service the strong truth seems to have prevailed. Since 2007, when the new law prosecuting secret agents under the communist regime, many a public figure turned out to have been working for the Soviet-backed secret service. Although some journalists suggest that this “which-hunt” for past operatives be stopped (Day, 2007), others state that there is never too late to uncover the truth (Ash, 2007). In the light of the fact that there has been too many a victim of the communist regime as well as due to the fact that none of democratic countries can let political criminals remain unpunished, it should be stated that the present government ought to continue its search for those who collaborated with the previous communist authorities. One of the main arguments against the new Polish vetting law may be the vast paperwork spawned by the Soviet secret police that “has made it difficult for researchers to conclude whether a suspect was an active informer or somebody unwittingly linked to the regime” (Day, 2007). However, although there is some superficial logic in such a conviction, this argument loses its cogency on closer inspection. Firstly, it is not a very burdensome task for the Polish government to find out whether a person in question really had ties with secret service or was forced to have made a self-incrimination. Secondly, the fact that there is a great number of files to search through does not seem to discourage neither the Polish High Court, nor the victims of the Soviet regime, who still wait for justice to be done to them. All things considered, it is incontestable that too great a dossier should not deter the Polish government from pinning the blame on past secret infomers. Another argument held by the ardent opponents of the new legislation is that “[d]ocuments were also ocassionally forged in order to discredit dissidents” (Day, 2007). This notion, however, is premised on great ignorance. In fact, rarely a person whose files had been forged avoided imprisonment, or deportation. The real agents, on the other hand, predominantly were rewarded, as in the case of Aleksander Wolszczan. Influential though such people now may be, they still ought to be charged with political crimes. To sum up, it seems incontrovertible that those who carry out the vetting process should proceed with it in order to find out and punish political criminals. The Polish new law indicting former secret agents has stirred controversy both among Poles. It seems indubittable that the present government should continue its search for those who collaborated with the previous communist authorities. Although, some left-wingers and those with affiliations with the broad left would sooner let things rest as they are, it is axiomatic that the victims of the communist regime ought to know the truth, as probably the whole Polish nation, and that the culprits be punished.
